/217 cont./

606 The husband helps economically the family of orientation of his wives, supplies them with produce from the conuco, but dealings with his wife's parents are reduced the most indispensable ones. When he meets his mother-in-law on the path, he changes his direction immediately, does not greet her, and would not dare to speak to her for anything. Between father-in-law and son-in-law there exists a cold friendship from which all manifestations of cordiality are absent. The same taboo exists between parents-in-law and daughter-in-law.

836 The Sanemá of the Erebato assured us that an unmarried young man could have sexual relations with all the unattached girls of his group and that very often the girls are the ones who [584] take the initiative in this. When a boy is attractive, he joins up with one or two girls, who /218/ in all frankness and good faith ask him to stay with them for a few nights more, offer him food, and hope that he will resolve to ask one of them to marry him.

593 It seems that in general women do not abandon their hus-
937 bands and confidently expect the spouse to behave in the same manner and not have extramarital sexual relations.

593 Frequently angry fights arise in the family out of passional
586 motives, to the point where the man no longer tolerates it and leaves the rancheria forever and eventually marries another woman in a distant pueblo.

595 Usually, only older men have several wives; polyandry
587 is not permitted. Widows, as a general rule, marry a brother of
607 the deceased husband, who takes his nieces and nephews under
[836] his protection. This custom does not cause any great problems, since the brother of the deceased has already had sexual intercourse with his sisters-in-law before marrying them, for he has
587 always considered them as possible wives. Nor do the children
593 find it difficult to accept their new father, whom they have al-
[601] ways called "father" and he has called them "children." In
[184] this way the Sanemá (and also the Waica, Surará, and Pakidai) are a society which allows polygamy, the sororate, and the levirate.

appropriately adjusted, he had no difficulty marrying the remaining two.

The close ties between siblings of the opposite sex and between brothers-in-law are also reflected in the fact that incestuous relationships are not severely punished. Thus, Kɐobäwë was known to be having an affair with his classificatory sister, Krëömi, but her husband overlooked the matter. Incest is not severely punished. The Yɐnomamö rely on the internal sanctions of shame and conscience, bolstered supernaturally by the fear that incestuous affairs prevent the release of the soul of the guilty party during cremation. As a counter measure, they dismember the body of someone known to have committed incest during his life time, and burn the parts of the body a much longer time than they normally would have otherwise. Some of the Yɐnomamö avoid incestuous affairs, according to Kɐobawë, because one of their ancestors turned into a sloth (ihama) after having committed incest. Kɐobawë himself initially denied having incestuous affairs because incest (yaweremou), as he put it, ". . . is the most despicable thing possible." Later, he confided that he had fornicated with his FaBrDa on a number of occasions and did not seem particularly concerned about the matter, except his fear that I would tell his wife. Other data suggest that incest, far from being feared, is widely practiced. In particular, kinship usage varies considerably from the expected usage predictable from genealogical data and the Iroquois terminology. Whenever I

602 of social organization,[1] and in analyses of particular societies.[2] It is not assumed here that the nature of the [114] social organization itself stems from the nature of the sentiments associated with particular dyadic kin ties, as was implied in Homans and Schneider's work (1955). Dyadic ties are a product of political, military, ideological and economic forces that shape Yąnomamö social organization, and reflect, rather than cause, that organization.

Of the large number of logically possible kinship dyads, only a few have structural relevance to this analysis. In particular, ties between agnates and ties between brothers-in-law must be considered to render intelligible the mechanics of Yąnomamö social organization.

602 Ties between distantly related agnates are the most 621 ambiguous, and the ones that usually break when villages split. 578 Conversely, ties between closely related agnates are strong and less likely to be severed in village splits.

607 Of the affinal ties, those linking brothers-in-law to each other are of the greatest structural importance and are often stronger than ties between distantly related agnates. 606 Secondarily, ties between a man and his son-in-law are strong, 601 but have fewer structural consequences than either brother-in-law (shoriwë) or brother (aiwë, osheya) ties.

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[1] Levi-Strauss, 1963, Ch. 2; Needham, 1962, Ch. 2.

[2] Leach, 1957.

1. Marriage Ties

602 593 581 583 [609] Marriages bind the groups of the spouses to each other in a system of exchanges involving goods, services, and the promise to reciprocate women at a later date. Yąnomamö marriage is peculiar in that the ties between husband and wife are very weak, but that ties between a man and his sister's husband are strong. The significance of marriage as an institution that initiates (or continues) alliances between non-agnatic groups stems, therefore, from the nature of the ties that it creates between the male members of the allied groups.

593 Ties between spouses are usually very tenuous, due largely to the fact that men are constantly suspicious of their wives' motives whenever the women leave the village unescorted. Men always suspect their wives of infidelity, and will even beat them if there is the slightest suspicion that the women have been seeing other men. A certain amount of 839 593 trysting goes on in all villages, but it is more frequent and more easily accomplished in larger villages. Discovery of [578] liaisons by the cuckold inevitably leads to club fighting between the factions of the lover and the husband. The woman 593 684 involved usually suffers more than either of the male principals in the fighting that follows, as women are severely punished by their husbands. The punishment usually consists of a beating with a club, but men frequently shoot their unfaithful wives with barbed arrows in a non-vital area of the body, such as the buttocks or leg. In one instance I witnessed,

593 684 the enraged husband struck his wife in the face with a burning log, severely burning her mouth. Burning is a common punishment, and many women bear immense scars from wounds inflicted by enraged husbands. Just before I left the field [578] a fight developed in Patanowë-tedi between a man and his wife's lover. The lover was killed in the fight and the woman's husband punished her by cutting off her ears with a [65] machete. Some women have been killed by enraged husbands, but in most of these cases, the deaths resulted from wounds that were not intended to be fatal.

• 609 613 *621 *628 [593] Despite the fact that the tie between spouses is weak, marriages create strong ties between a man and his sister's husband. This tie is of great significance in the social organization of the Yąnomamö, as it is stable, well defined, non-ambiguous and politically important. The brother-in-law (shoriwë) tie is the key link in alliances between local descent groups, both within and between villages.

609 601 The term shoriwë (brother-in-law, MoBrSo, FaSiSo, friend) is used constantly by Yąnomamö men when they address any new male acquaintance. Shoriwë implies a set of obligations and duties between the speakers. One can depend on his shoriwë for material goods and gifts, and a request for such items from a shoriwë is not easily denied: shoriwë is, in addition to goods-giver, wife-giver. The Yąnomamö use this [797] [609] [101] term for foreigners as well; they use it so frequently that the Salesian Missionaries who have recently contacted a few

groups of Yąnomamö have begun referring to the entire tribe as "Los Shori." The Yąnomamö address the missionaries with this term hoping to maximize their chances of obtaining desirable manufactured goods such as machetes and axes.

Men who are not related by blood constantly remind each other of obligations when they use this kinship term. A brother-in-law deserves respect, fair treatment, and gratitude. As the term is reciprocal, a conversation between two shoriwä is punctuated frequently by these constant reminders that each owes the other goods, services and respect by virtue of the fact that they stand in wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship to each other. Such conversations, usually about material goods or women, strike the outsider as something of verbal contests to determine which of the two speakers is more of a shoriwä than the other, i.e., who owes the other more goods, services, gratitude and generosity. One who has actually given a sister to the other's group has an advantage, in a trading sense, as he can more legitimately claim goods from the wife receiver.

When men visit the village of an ally to beg, trade or participate in feasts, they call all non-related men of that village 'brother-in-law,' emphasizing the fact that they stand in wife-giver relationship to them, and deserve, therefore, the generosity of the hosts.

Alliances between villages involve, in addition to military aid, mutual feasting and trading. It must be remembered that alliances, no matter how many marriage ex-

changes bind the villages to each other, are weak and unstable. The more frequently allies visit and feast with each other, the less likely treachery will take place, as a certain amount of trust and friendship is generated by visiting and feasting.

The tendency for Yąnomamö villages to create artificial shortages of certain manufactured items is related to feasting and the creation of organic solidarity of a sort. After Yąnomamö villages enter into alliances, they tend to adjust their economic production of such items as bows, arrow cane, spun cotton, tobacco, baskets, cultivated drugs, dogs and clay cooking pots. Any village is capable of producing all of these goods, but allied villages create shortages of some of these items so that they can become dependent on the productivity of their allies, thereby having excuses to visit and trade.

One of the most significant relationship in trading between villages is the shoriwë tie, and these men trade with each other whenever they visit. As a trade frequently involves feasting, the specialization in production of specific items leads to greater solidarity between allied villages. Although it would be an error simply to identify the role of shoriwë with that of trading partner, this aspect of the shoriwë tie, particularly between men of different villages, is by no means negligible in accounting for the solidarity this relationship promotes in inter-village political ties.

The way the trading is conducted also contributes to

inter-village visiting and solidarity, for one trade is usually the prelude to another. For example, the Bisaasi-tedi obtain much of their spun cotton and curare arrow points from their Shamatari allies. It takes considerable time and labor to accumulate these items. When the Shamatari are visited by the Bisaasi-tedi, the latter make known their desire to have these items, and their hosts promise to produce them. When the items are accumulated, the Shamatari visit the Bisaasi-tedi to inform them their cotton and arrow points are ready. A feast is arranged and the items are given over to the Bisaasi-tedi after the celebration terminates. The Shamatari then request specific items from their hosts, and the cycle continues. Neither village is completely 'paid up' regarding goods it owes to the other, so that each exchange as Mauss (1954) argued, brings forth another.[1] The imporant point is that Yąnomamö trading is not stimulated by naturally occuring shortages or monopolies on resources; artificial shortages are created and these promote visiting between allies. In Durkheimian terms, the division of labor, irrespective of the causes, promotes organic solidarity between allied villages. And, the kinship category most intimately involved in the trading is the brother-in-law.

. . . . Affinal ties between villages, therefore, owe their

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[1] The parallel between this and bride price payment in Burma is striking. See Leach, 1957. It is worth noting at this point that the Yąnomamö have no word for 'free' or 'gift'; the closest they can come to it is: "something given without cause." But nothing is given without cause, and they shrewdly keep track of all debts.

628 581 609 Affinal ties between villages, therefore, owe their ability to promote solidarity between the allies to the obligations, duties and trading relationships that marriages impose on brothers-in-law.

607 602 621 591 Within villages, brothers-in-law have similar obligations to each other. The strength of the co-residential shoriwä ties, however, is influenced by other factors besides promises to exchange goods, women, and services. First, co-residence itself promotes a certain amount of amity between all classes of kin. Second, co-residential shoriwä are usually cognatically related because their respective agnatic groups have exchanged women in ascending generations, i.e., many of them are related to each other as MoBrSo or FaSiSo. So, in addition to mere promises to give women to each other, co-residential shoriwä ties are strengthened by ties of cognatic kinship and co-residence.

609 602 621 613 582 584 The strength of the ties between co-residential shoriwä is best illustrated by contrasting it to the weakness of the agnatic tie between two local descent groups of the same lineage. In anticipation of the discussion of agnatic relationship, I will point out here that the political interests of local descent groups focus on acquisition of women from other descent groups within the village. When a village has two or more agnatically related descent groups, the men in these respective groups are de facto rivals for the women in the village. Simultaneously, these distantly related agnates are frequently competitors in the disposition of some female agnates who do not belong unambiguously to one or the other local descent groups.

000 groups. In a large village comprised of two large lineages, *621 each having two or more local descent groups, the particular 613 602 local descent groups of each lineage will have stronger ties 598 with non-agnatic descent groups within that village than with groups of distantly related agnates. When there are feuds within the village, the groups that have most in common with each other are those linked by affinal rather than agnatic ties, and these affinally linked groups stick together should the feud lead to a village split.[1] While the tie between [607] closely related agnates is stronger than that between brothers-in-law, the latter are usually stronger than the ties between distantly related agnates.

606 Finally, the son-in-law tie complements the brother-607 in-law tie in binding local descent groups to each other *621 within villages. Older adult males of local descent groups 613 578 can depend on the support of brothers, brothers-in-law, and 582 sons-in-law in village feuds, more so than on the support of distantly related agnates. In the competition for women, affines in a faction exchange women rather than compete for them; just the opposite is true of the relationships between distantly related agnates.

593 2. Agnatic ties

*621 . One of the two most important consanguineal ties having structural concomitants among the Yanomamö is the tie between siblings of the opposite sex. These are not as

[128] [1]See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion of the structure of village factions.

628 602 613 726 [622] same lineages. The warfare between the two groups, therefore, was largely a struggle between groups of distantly related agnates. Kąobawĕ, the headman of Upper Bisaasi-tedi, participated in the raiding against the Patanowĕ-tedi. In one skirmish, he shot his classificatory brother, Rakoiwĕ, but Rakoiwĕ survived the wound. This man is as closely related to Kąobawĕ as most of the men that presently constitute his agnatic following in Upper Bisaasi-tedi, again illustrating the significance of co-residence in determining the strength [583] of the agnatic tie. Two young men from Patanowĕ-tedi recenlty joined the Bisaasi-tedi to obtain wives. After they arrived, the Bisaasi-tedi and the Patanowĕ-tedi resumed their old [606] hostilities. The fathers-in-law of the two men recruited [583] both of them into raiding parties that attacked the Patanowĕ-tedi, and both men participated willingly, despite the fact that their actual fathers and brothers live in Patanowĕ-tedi. One of the young men, Sirorowĕ, told me that he would have avoided shooting his own father (Yoyosiwĕ) and actual brothers, but would have shot more distant agnates.

628 926 602 607 622 That the brother-in-law tie is stronger than the tie between distantly related agnates is also illustrated in the history of a war between Mahekodo-tedi and Yabitawĕ-tedi. These two villages are led by men who are classificatory brothers. The war stated when a man from Boreta-tedi, a brother-in-law of the headman of Mahekodo-tedi, was killed by the Yabitawĕ-tedi headman in a club fight. As the slain man's sisters were married to the Mahekodo-tedi headman, the

latter felt obliged to revenge the man's death by raiding his classificatory brother's village.

Similar cases occur in internal village fighting. Hunobawë, an Upper Bisaasi-tedi man of some 60 years, gathered a stalk of bananas from his garden and hung them in the roof of his hut to ripen. His son, Dikawë, 18 years old, discovered the ripening bananas and ate a large number of them without the consent of his father. When Hunobawë discovered the loss, he went into a rage and attacked Dikawë with a club. Dikawë got his own club and began assailing the old man. This precipitated a general free-for-all in the village, as large numbers of men took one side or the other in the melee.

Club fights between historically related but separate villages also pit agnates against each other. When Bisaasi-tedi's Lower Group seized a girl that the Monou-tedi had abducted from the Patanowë-tedi, a club fight was arranged to settle the dispute. But, the most important factions in Monou-tedi and the two Bisaasi-tedi groups were local descent groups of the same lineage, and their headmen were classificatory brothers. Although the dispute and club fight ultimately involved all the able-bodied men of each village, the fight was initiated by distantly related agnatic groups of the same lineage.

Some dyadic kinship ties are more stable than others. It is not possible to say, however, that any one in particular is so inherently stable that fighting between such kinsmen can not occur. Certain kinds of violence, however, are not

organization is only approximated, however, as an examination of the genealogies given in Appendix A will show. The smaller the village, the more conspicuous is the tendency for the composition to approach a moiety-like structure. Larger villages are more composite and may contain as many as four or five distinct lineage segments.[1]

The tendency for small villages to be characterized by two (and only two) dominant lineage segments, each linked to the other by marriage ties, recurs with sufficient frequency to permit me to use a simple dual organization model as the basis of the analysis of village structure. The model given in Figure 1 should be taken as only a heuristic devise in the discussion of Yąnomamö village structure that follows; the Yąnomamö do not conceive of their villages as being bifurcated into two groups, for in most instances they are not. And, small villages soon lose their moiety-like structure as they begin to include males and females from villages with which marriage ties are made.

The relationships between kin discussed in the previous chapter are all given in Figure 1. The adult males in Generation 1 exchange sisters[2] and are, therefore, related to each other as shoriwä (brother-in-law). This is a well-defined, stable, non-ambiguous relationship; the males in

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[1] See Appendix A for a discussion of village composition. Details of one small village are given in the Appendix, but the composition by lineage is summarized for three other villages.

[2] In Figure 1, $A_{1.1}$'s wife is the sister of $B_{1.2}$.

602 607 582 583 Generation 1 have essentially solidary relationships to each other, at least in terms of the model.

The males of Generation 1 are related to the females *[621] of that generation as either husband or brother. Ties between siblings of the opposite sex are affective and promote village solidarity.

613 602 Males of lineage A in the second generation are simultaneously sister's sons and daughter's husbands of male $B_{1.2}$, both relationships being conducive to solidarity. They are [583] bound to $B_{1.2}$ by affective ties and obligations to perform bride service. An analogous set of relationships binds the Generation 2, lineage B males to $A_{1.1}$. The males of both lineages in the second generation are related to each other as either brother or brother-in-law, both relationships being stable within the assumptions of this model (see below). The

*[621] FIG. 1: Ideal Yanomamö Village Composition



11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

128 582 621 613 respect to the male members of lineage X. Generation III shows that individuals x_3 and x_4 are full brothers. The individuals x_5 and x_8 of generation IV, however, are not shown as brothers, although in Yąnomamö kinship usage they would be such.

128 582 602 611 613 I have not indicated them as being related as brothers in order to draw attention to a fault line that may develop when the members of a single lineage (X in this case) marry into more than one other lineage (W and Y in this case). x_3 and one of his sisters married into lineage W, whereas x_4 and one of his sisters continued to exchange with members of lineage Y. In the following generation the kinship tie of "brother" between x_5 and x_8 is considerably weaker than the same "brother" tie between their fathers (x_3 and x_4). In generation V, the "brother" tie between x_7 and x_8 is weaker still. One of the reasons that *agnatic* ties[5] weaken in this case is that the men in question are drawn into intimate relationship with the kinship groups from which they obtain their wives and assume, because of the principle of reciprocity, obligations to their affinally related (that is, by marriage) kinsmen.

128 582 602 611 613 621 Secondly, because agnates of the same generation are "brothers," they can marry the same women and are, hence, competitors. In other words, the obligations to exchange women (reciprocity) can link the members of affinally related groups to each other more intimately than ties of blood between males of the same lineage. (This can be more readily seen in Figs. 3–5 and 3–6, discussed later, but it can also be partially illustrated here.) If the village shown in Fig. 3–1 were to split in generation V and form two new villages, lineage X would pull apart along the fault line shown. That is, parts of lineage X would end up in each of the two new groups because the affinal (marriage) ties between its members and their wife-givers are stronger than the agnatic ties within the lineage. Individual x_7 and his sister would form a new village with w_3 (and his sister) while x_8, his "brother" (agnate), would remain paired with lineage Y. Lineage X would therefore be represented in both of the two new villages; individuals x_7 and x_8 would "feel" even more remotely related because they now live in different villages, although they would continue to call each other "brother." Finally, the two new villages would again demonstrate the dual organization that characterized generations I and II of the original village of Fig. 3–1. For the sake of simplicity I have shown each married pair with only two children (except in generation III) so that the village remains constant in size, growing only by the addition of new members. In an actual village lineages X and Y might comprise up to 80 percent of the population so that the addition of a few new members such as w_1 would not appreciably alter the dual composition.

128 613 582 602 607 In Fig. 3–1, lineage X stands as wife-giver and wife-receiver with respect to the other two lineages. The significance of this relationship cannot be exaggerated in the analysis of Yąnomamö social organization. Its strength derives from the obligations kinship groups have toward each other once they enter into reciprocal marriage exchanges. The wife-giver/wife-receiver relationship is also reflected in the attitudes men have toward their affines, such as brothers-in-law, as opposed to attitudes toward distant agnates. A man is on very intimate terms with his brother-in-law, jokes with him, gives him possessions, and protects him; a man treats an agnate of the same age with great reserve and coolness and tends to be jealous of him. He cannot, for example, directly ask

[5]Kinship ties between patrilineally related kinsmen.

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18 Yanoama SQ18

him to do a favor, whereas he could ask this of a brother-in-law.[6] As shall presently be seen, the dynamics of Yąnomamö social organization originate in the politics of obtaining a wife. Within this context, agnates are competitors and affines are allies. This has an important effect on the manner in which villages fission and form new groups. The point to remember at this juncture is that ties of marriage are in many cases stronger than ties of blood.

I emphasize this because many anthropologists argue from "first principles" that ties of blood are—by definition—more capable of promoting solidarity and amity than ties by marriage. The controversy over "complementary filiation" between E. R. Leach (1957) and M. Fortes (1959), still not satisfactorily resolved, was essentially a debate about the analytical significance of marriage ties. Focusing on only one of the issues and rephrasing the arguments so as to apply to Fig. 3–2, the debate ran something like this: Both Leach and Fortes seemed to agree that in societies having lineal descent groups (lineages), the descent groups would tend to fall apart unless some kind of tie bound the members to each other. That is, lineages X and Y of Fig. 3–2 would, in short, pull away from each other unless they were held together by some special social tie. Fortes argued that this special tie was the solidarity and amity that grew out of the cognatic (see Glossary) kinship ties between the two lineages which arise when individuals marry blood relatives. Looking at generation V, for example, Fortes would argue that lineages X and Y are bound to each other because x_8 and y_5 married women to whom they are related by blood (as FaSiDa and MoBrDa). He argues from first principles that solidarity emanates from the blood ties. Leach, however, states that in generation V the two lineages are bound to each other by obligations to reciprocate goods, services, and women and that the solidarity of the two lineages derives from the affinal ties themselves (shown as "15" and "16" in Fig. 3–2). If we look only at generation V, the argument cannot be resolved, since the data support both arguments equally well, or at least do not convincingly support one rather than the other. I might add that both arguments can be supported by data not given in Fig. 3–2; Fortes' arguments are supported, for example, by the additional fact that Yąnomamö men do not stringently have to avoid their mothers-in-law when they are related to them in the fashion shown in Fig. 3–2, whereas the avoidance taboo is very onerous when a man's mother-in-law is not a blood relative. If, however, attention is focused on the events of generation III and their consequences examined, it can readily be seen that the affinal (marriage) ties in generation V are stronger than some of the agnatic (blood) ties, and the latter break when the village fissions. (This can be even more readily seen in Fig. 3–4 and 3–5, discussed later.) Thus, it cannot be argued that Yąnomamö lineage solidarity derives exclusively from blood ties and "complementary filiation." There is another issue. Structural analyses depend in large measure on a sharp distinction between marriage (affinal) ties and blood (consanguineal) ties. Fortes seems to deny that affinal ties as such exist independently of blood ties, and he has "subsumed" them into his concept of "complementary filiation." If there is no such thing as affinal ties between lineal descent groups, then structural

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 61]

[6] In addition, it is by no means rare for agnates to get into club fights over women. I even have recorded a number of cases of men shooting and killing a "brother" during raids. This happened on two occasions during my first stay in the field, and I have reports of several additional cases obtained from informants who were describing past raids.

other when they are children and young men. As time passes and these men become old enough to seek wives, members of the groups to which they belong enter into competition with each other. The men themselves are under some pressure to display their personal autonomy, and they treat each other with considerable reserve as they get older. They cannot boss each other around or expect many favors from one another. Kaobawä, for example, cannot ask his adult brothers to perform menial tasks for him. This is because each man—particularly those men who compete for the same women—attempts to convince all others that he is capable of ferocity. The more remote the genealogical distance, the greater is the reserve with which mature agnates treat each other. That is, distant parallel cousins would behave toward each other with considerably more reserve than would actual brothers, although the men in question are all related to each other terminologically as brothers. If such men live in different villages, their mutual relationships are even more reserved when they meet.

The relationship between men who call each other brother-in-law, however, grows more intimate as the men get older. They can play and joke with each other, whereas agnates cannot, for they are not competitors and are not constrained to exhibit their fierceness to each other. They can cement their relationships to each other by merely promising to give their daughters to each other's sons. They can ask favors of each other, expecting them to be done without complaint.

Kaobawä's relationships to two men in his village illustrate the distinction between agnates and affines. Both men joined his group from the village of Patanowä-teri some time after Kaobawä's group separated from the village. One of the men, Nadesiwä, is related to him agnatically: they call each other "brother" because their fathers were half-brothers. Nadesiwä is in Kaobawä's local descent group, but is not quite on a par with the other members in the political affairs of the group. The other men in the group—Kaobawä and his closer brothers—put pressure on Nadesiwä to give his only daughter to a man in a distant Shamatari village for the purpose of stabilizing an alliance. This was a considerable sacrifice for him to make, as his daughter, after the completion of bride service, will have to live in her husband's village—Nadesiwä will have no coresident son-in-law to provide him with meat when he gets old. Kaobawä and Nadesiwä treat each other with respect and great reserve and do not ask each other for favors.

The other man, Kumamawä, is Bahimi's actual brother; Kaobawä is related to him, therefore, as an affine as well as by cognatic kinship ties. That is, they are first cross-cousins by blood and also related to each other by marriage. Kumamawä is a frequent visitor in Kaobawä's house and enthusiastically executes the numerous tasks that Kaobawä asks of him. They are members of different local descent groups, but their groups are related to each other by marriage exchanges that go back several generations. In short, Kaobawä's personal ties to his brother-in-law are warmer and friendlier than his relationship to one of the members of his own local descent group.

Daily Activities

Kaobawä's village is oval-shaped. His house is located among those of his agnatic kinsmen; they occupy a continuous arc along one side of the village. Each of the

156 622 628 607 577 721 [123] [114] [123] 156 622 593 578

On another occasion a group of men from Patanowä-teri arrived to explore with Kaobawä the possibility of peace between their two villages. They were brothers-in-law to him and were fairly certain that he would protect them from the village hotheads. One of the ambitious men in Kaobawä's group saw in this an opportunity to enhance his prestige and made plans to murder the three visitors. This man, Paruriwä, was a very cunning, treacherous fellow and quite jealous of Kaobawä's position as headman. He wanted to be the village leader and privately told me to address him as the headman. On this occasion Kaobawä let it be known that he intended to protect the visitors. For the better part of the day the village was in a state of suspense. Paruriwä and his followers were not to be found anywhere; a rumor spread that they had painted themselves black and were well armed. Kaobawä and his supporters, mostly his own brothers and brothers-in-law, remained in the village all day, their weapons close at hand. Late in the afternoon Paruriwä and his men appeared in their black paint and took up strategic posts around the village. He himself held an axe. He strutted arrogantly up to the visitors holding his axe as if he were ready to strike. The village became very quiet, and most of the women and children left. Neither Kaobawä nor the Patanowä-teri visitors batted an eyelash when Paruriwä approached, although the others were visibly nervous and sat up in their hammocks. Instead of striking the visitors with the axe as he appeared to suggest he was going to do, he invited one of them out to chant with him. Within seconds all three of the visitors had paired off with members of Paruriwä's group and were chanting passionately with them, explaining the reasons for their visit and giving their justification for the state of hostilities.

The crisis has been averted because of Kaobawä's implied threat that he would defend the visitors with force. A number of men in Paruriwä's group were visitors from Monou-teri; their headman had been killed a few months earlier by the Patanowä-teri. When Paruriwä failed to go through with his plan, they left the village in a rage, hoping to recruit a raiding party in their own village and ambush the visitors when they left.

Kaobawä realized that the visitors would not be safe until they got back home, since the Monou-teri would attempt to intercept them. He visited me that night and asked me to take the visitors back to their village at dawn in my canoe, knowing that I had already planned a trip there for the immediate future. After I agreed to accelerate my own plans, he proceeded to give me instructions about the trip: I was not to stop at any of the villages along the Orinoco River to visit, for all of them were at war with the Patanowä-teri and would shoot my companions on sight. The Patanowä-teri men lay on the floor of my canoe and covered themselves with a tarp when we passed these villages. The people on the bank shouted curses at me for not stopping to visit and give them trade goods. At this time the Patanowä-teri were being raided by about a dozen different villages. We had to cover part of the distance to their village on foot, proceeding very cautiously because of the danger of raiders. At one point the men showed me the spot where a Hasaböwä-teri raiding party had killed a Patanowä-teri woman a week earlier. Thus, Kaobawä not only protected the visitors while they were in his village but he also arranged a "safe-conduct" for their return.

Kaobawä keeps order in the village when people get out of hand. Paruriwä, for example, is particularly cruel to his four wives and beats them mercilessly for even slight provocations. None of his wives have brothers in the village, and few people are courageous enough to interfere with Paruriwä when he is angry. On one occasion Kaobawä was holding a feast for the members of an allied village. His preparations were being

11: Chagnon E-5 (1964-1968) 1968 SQ18. Yanoama SQ18

One of Damowī's brothers—who also participated in this raid—was married to one of the victim's daughters.

The Monou-teri had anticipated their raid by clearing a new garden site across the Mavaca River, where they hoped to take refuge after the inevitable revenge raids from Patanowī-teri began. They had hoped to complete their garden before the raids became intense, as the Mavaca River would have provided a natural obstacle to raiders. The Patanowī-teri, however, were infuriated by this killing and raided the Monou-teri immediately. Two of the raiders were Damowī's "brothers."

The raiders caught Damowī outside the new garden searching for honey. This was in the first week of February. He had two of his wives with him and one child. He was looking up a tree when the raiders shot a volley of arrows into his body, at least five of which struck him in the abdomen. He managed to nock one of his own arrows and shoot at the raiders, although he was probably mortally wounded at the time. Then Bishewī, one of the raiders, shot a final arrow at Damowī, piercing his neck below his ear. He fell to the ground and died after being struck by this arrow.

The raiders did not attempt to abduct the women, as they were close to the Monou-teri campsite and they had to cross the Mavaca River to escape. The women ran back to the village to tell the others what happened. Instead of giving chase, as they ought to have done—according to Kaobawī and the others in Bisaasi-teri—the Monou-teri themselves fled into the jungle and hid until darkness, afraid that the raiders might return.

The man who fired the fatal arrow into Damowī's neck was a son of the man the Monou-teri shot in their raid. Two of the men who shot Damowī were his classificatory brothers (members of the same lineage), three were brothers-in-law (including the man who shot the fatal arrow), and one was a man who had been adopted into the Patanowī-teri village as a child, after he and his mother were abducted from a distant Shamatari village.

The Monou-teri burned the corpse of Damowī the next day. They held a mortuary ceremony that week and invited their allies, members of the two Shamatari villages and the two groups of Bisaasi-teri, to participate. Gourds of the dead man's ashes were given to specific men in several of the allied villages, an act calculated to reaffirm solidarity and friendship. Damowī's widows were given to his two eldest surviving brothers.

Kaobawī, a classificatory brother to Damowī, assumed the responsibility of organizing a revenge raid. Damowī's own brothers failed to step forward to assume this responsibility, and for a while there was no leadership whatsoever in Monou-teri. Finally, Orusiwī, the oldest and most competent member of the *Hor* lineage, emerged as the *de facto* village leader, a position he acquired largely by default. He was related to the slain headman as brother-in-law, and their respective descent groups dominated village politics.[2] Hence, leadership in Monou-teri shifted from the *Shi* lineage to the *Hor* lineage.

Kaobawī delayed the revenge raid until April, giving the Monou-teri time to expand their new garden. This date also coincided with the beginning of the rains, thus reducing the possibility of a retaliation until the next dry season and providing the Monou-teri even more time to expand their new garden and abandon the old one.

The Monou-teri were afraid to return to their producing garden, so they divided their time between their newly cleared site, where they worked at cutting timber and

[2] See Table 3-1 and Fig. 3-5 of Chapter 3 for the lineage composition of Monou-teri.